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Abstract
Considerations of scientific evidence are often thought to provide externalism with 
the dialectical upper hand in the internalism–externalism debate. How so? A cou-
ple of reasons are forthcoming in the literature. (1) Williamson (2000) argues that 
the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the 
fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) 
that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. (2) 
Kelly (Philosophy Compass, 3 (5), 933–955, 2008; 2016) argues that only external-
ism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. In this article, 
I respond to Williamson and Kelly’s arguments. First, I show that the E = K thesis 
isn’t supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is 
unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and 
as justified scientific belief in the history of science. Second, I argue that there are 
internalist views that can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that 
those views indeed do better in that regard than the (externalist) view proposed by 
Kelly. The upshot is that considerations of scientific evidence do not favor external-
ism over internalism.
Keyword Scientific evidence; Evidence; Epistemic internalism; Epistemic 
externalism; Justification; Publicity
1  Epistemic Internalism and Externalism
Given the plausible assumption that facts about justification are not brute facts, 
but rather that they depend upon one’s evidence, epistemic internalism claims that 
one’s evidence is provided by one’s internal states. A common way of unpacking the 
notion of internal states is by saying that one’s internal states are one’s non-factive 
mental states, where a mental state is non-factive just in case it doesn’t necessarily 
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have true propositional content.1 Epistemic externalism, on the other hand, is natu-
rally then defined as the claim that it isn’t the case that all evidence is provided by 
one’s non-factive mental states.
Ever since Edmund Gettier (1963) first exposed the inadequacies inherent in our 
traditional analysis of our most cherished epistemological concept—namely, knowl-
edge—epistemologists have discussed and debated the internalism–externalism dis-
tinction—first by focusing on reliabilism, and later by focusing on the nature and 
epistemic function of evidence.2 Internalists usually argue their case by reflecting on 
various scenarios in which the subject’s rational standing appears to be a function of 
his or her own first-person perspective on the world. Externalists, on the other hand, 
often argue their case by reflecting on our concepts of evidence and reason, includ-
ing the way in which we talk about what our justifying evidence or reasons for belief 
in various contexts are.3 In this article, I will examine two such externalist argu-
ments, both of which have as their conclusion the claim that internalism ultimately 
must be false insofar as it is unable to account for the way in which the concept 
of evidence is used in scientific discourse. The first of these arguments is offered 
by Timothy Williamson (2000) in support of his E = K thesis, whereas the second 
is offered by Thomas Kelly (2008, 2016) and focuses on the public or intersubjec-
tive character of scientific evidence. In response, I will argue that Williamson’s view 
isn’t supported by how we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to 
account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified 
scientific belief in the history of science. And in response to the second argument I 
will argue that internalist views are just as suited to account for the public character 
of scientific evidence as externalist views; indeed, they do better in that regard than 
the externalist view proposed by Kelly.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 begins from the assumption that 
facts about justification depend upon one’s evidence, while clarifying some confu-
sion about the concept of evidence. Section 3 presents Williamson’s views on evi-
dence and the argument for the E = K thesis. Section 4 responds to that argument. 
Section 5 presents the argument that scientific evidence has a public character which 
internalism cannot account for. Section 6 responds by explaining the way in which 
1 This position is known as mentalism, and its proponents include Pollock and Cruz (1999); Conee and 
Feldman (1985); Wedgwood (2002); Smithies (2012); McCain (2016); and Egeland (2019).
2 Indeed, after the publication of Gettier’s seminal article, several epistemologists have shifted their 
focus from knowledge to justification or evidence. As one commentator puts it: “knowledge is not really 
the proper central concern of epistemologico-sceptical inquiry. There is not necessarily any lasting dis-
comfort in the claim that, contrary to our preconceptions, we have no genuine knowledge in some broad 
area of thought—say in the area of theoretical science. We can live with the concession that we do not, 
strictly, know some of the things we believed ourselves to know, provided we can retain the thought that 
we are fully justified in accepting them.” (Wright, 1991, 88.).
 Similarly, focusing primarily on science rather than philosophy, John Earman (1993, 37) says that “the 
main concern is rarely whether or not a scientist ‘knows’ that some theory is true but rather whether or 
not she is justified in believing it.”.
 For a similar take on recent developments in contemporary epistemology, see Williamson (2000, 184).
3 For an excellent introduction to many of the arguments that have made their mark on the internalism–
externalism debate (although it fails to cover the kind of externalist argument which this article focuses 
on), see Littlejohn (2012, introduction).
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internalism can account for the publicity of scientific evidence. Section 7 concludes 
and discusses the role of scientific evidence in the internalism–externalism debate.
2  Evidence
Nowadays it is common for epistemologists to think that one’s evidence plays a big 
role in determining what one has justification to believe. In this article, I will fol-
low suit and assume that one’s evidence largely is responsible for the propositional 
justification one has. However, we need to say a little bit more about what evidence 
is. For all that the assumption above tells us, evidence is whatever justifies belief (or 
other doxastic attitudes). Consider for example the conception of evidence suggested 
by Jaegwon Kim:
[T]he concept of evidence is inseparable from that of justification. When we 
talk of “evidence” in an epistemological sense we are talking about justifica-
tion: one thing is “evidence” for another just in case the first tends to enhance 
the reasonableness or justification of the second. . . A strictly nonnormative 
concept of evidence is not our concept of evidence; it is something that we do 
not understand. (Kim, 1988, 390–391.)4
However, this conception of evidence is too liberal to be theoretically satisfying. 
Indeed, as Jack Lyons (2016, 1057) also has pointed out, Kim’s conception of evi-
dence faces a couple of serious problems. First, it renders evidentialism a wholly 
uninteresting thesis insofar as it becomes analytically true. If evidence simply is 
whatever justifies or rationalizes certain doxastic attitudes, then facts about justifica-
tion will of course be determined by one’s evidence. But we already knew that! Our 
beliefs are justified by whatever justifies our beliefs. There’s nothing new under the 
sun.
Second, Kim’s conception of evidence is counterintuitive insofar as it encour-
ages us to conceptualize certain phenomena as evidence that clearly don’t appear 
to be evidence. Consider for example some externalist views of justification, like 
reliabilism and proper functionalism.5 According to such views, the reliability of 
one’s doxastic dispositions or the proper functioning of one’s cognitive faculties 
does (epistemically) contribute to the justification of our beliefs. Hence, according 
to Kim’s conception, such phenomena constitute evidence (on those views). How-
ever, this clearly does not seem right. Reliable doxastic dispositions and properly 
functioning cognitive faculties should not count as evidence—regardless of whether 
or not theories that emphasize the justifying role played by such phenomena are 
correct.
How should we conceptualize one’s evidence then? I want to suggest as an intui-
tive conception of evidence, with minimal theoretical commitments, that one’s 
4 Cf. Kelly (2008, 941–942; 2016).
5 It should of course be noted that not all proponents of reliabilism or proper functionalism take them-
selves to be offering an analysis of justification.
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justifying evidence is the epistemic (as opposed to pragmatic) reasons for belief (or 
other doxastic attitudes) in one’s possession.,67 This, in other words, means that evi-
dence is the kind of thing that speaks in favor of the truth of certain propositions and 
which subjects typically find it natural to rely on in the practice of justifying their 
beliefs—i.e., in demonstrating what their beliefs have going for them that serve as 
indicators of their being true. Moreover, it also means that justifying evidence—
i.e., the kind of evidence that justifies belief—must somehow belong to a subject. In 
order for someone to have a piece of evidence, it cannot simply be the case that the 
evidence exists somewhere in the world. Instead, the evidence must somehow be in 
the subject’s cognitive possession; otherwise, it wouldn’t be evidence that one has or 
is in possession of.8
Continuing, I will rely on this intuitive conception of evidence in my discussion 
of the two externalist arguments purporting to show that there is a specific species of 
evidence—namely, scientific evidence—that only can be accommodated in an exter-
nalist framework. Let’s begin by turning to Williamson’s views on the matter and the 
argument for the E = K thesis.
3  Williamson on Scientific Evidence and the E = K Thesis
Williamson thinks that only true propositions (or facts) can be evidence. First, he 
thinks that all evidence is propositional since one’s evidence can be evaluated for 
properties like consistency and inconsistency, coherence, probabilification, entail-
ment, explanatory fit, and the like. Such properties only hold among items that can 
be considered true or false, which means that they must be propositions. Indeed, he 
thinks that “propositionality is essential to the functional role of evidence” (Wil-
liamson, 2007b, 209, footnote 1).9 Second, Williamson thinks that only a proper 
subset of all propositions can be evidence—namely, the true ones—since proposi-
tions that are inconsistent with one’s evidence must be false. If propositions incon-
sistent with one’s evidence must be false, then it follows that the propositions that 
constitute one’s evidence must be true.10 Thus, Williamson thinks that all evidence 
9 Williamson (2000, 194–196) appears to offer three different, but similar, arguments for the claim that 
all evidence is propositional. The first (194–195) argues from the fact that evidence typically is used in 
abductive reasoning; the second (195–196) argues from the role of evidence in probabilistic reasoning; 
and the third (196) argues from the fact that evidence sometimes can be used to rule out hypotheses.
10 Williamson (2007b, 209) puts the point as follows: “Why is it bad for an assertion to be inconsistent 
with the evidence? A natural answer is: because then it is false. That answer assumes that evidence con-
sists only of true propositions. For if an untrue proposition p is evidence, the proposition that p is untrue 
is true but inconsistent with the evidence. Using ‘fact’ for ‘true proposition,’ we may say that evidence 
consists only of facts.” However, this is clearly a question-begging response to those who don’t assume 
that evidence must be true.
6 Although I do not have space to discuss his article, I think this suggestion avoids Brunero’s (2018) 
counterexamples to the reasons-as-evidence view.
7 For a similar suggestion, see Brogaard (2018).
8 The present suggestion is neutral on the question of whether one’s evidence/reasons are propositionally 




consists of true propositions that support certain (other) propositions by deductively 
entailing them, by increasing their probability, or by abductively supporting them.
Moreover, Williamson also agrees that in order for evidence to play a justifying 
role it must somehow be in the subject’s cognitive possession. More specifically, he 
thinks that the subject somehow must grasp the propositions that are included in his 
evidence:
One can use an hypothesis to explain why A only if one grasps the proposition 
that A. Thus only propositions which one grasps can function as evidence in 
one’s inferences to the best explanation. By this standard, only propositions 
which one grasps count as part of one’s evidence. (Williamson, 2000, 195.)
However, he doesn’t think that it is sufficient for a subject to believe a true propo-
sition p in order for p to be included in his evidence. Rather, what is required is that 
the subject knows p. Thus, only knowledge is evidence.11 Moreover, he also thinks 
that all knowledge is evidence, which leads him to endorse the famous E = K thesis:
E = K: “knowledge, and only knowledge, constitutes evidence” (Williamson, 
2000, 185).
And later he endorses what we may call the R = K thesis:
R = K“p is available to you as a reason if and only if you know p.” (Williamson, 
2007a, 120.)
The E = K thesis is clearly an externalist theory of justification and evidence (and 
the same also goes for the R = K thesis, of course). This can easily be seen by com-
paring knowledge with internal states. Under the definition of internalism that we’re 
currently considering, internal states are non-factive mental states. By contrast, 
knowledge is a factive state since it necessarily has true propositional content.12 It 
therefore fails to qualify as an internal state, and if knowledge cannot be considered 
an internal state, while at the same time providing evidence for our beliefs, then 
E = K must be an externalist theory.
Williamson offers several considerations in favor of the E = K thesis.13 Here I 
want to take a closer look at one of the less discussed reasons he offers.14 As he sees 
it, in the scientific discourse, a body of evidence is treated as consisting of true prop-
ositions that are commonly known (or perhaps just widely available) in the scientific 
community. This is how he puts it in his Knowledge and Its Limits:
11 To support this claim, Williamson (2000, 200–201) offers the now well-known “balls in a bag” argu-
ment. For a critical discussion of the argument, see Lyons (2016, 1060–1061).
12 I say that knowledge is a factive state, rather than a factive mental state, because I don’t want to com-
mit myself to the view that it actually is a mental state. Williamson (2000) of course claims that it is, but 
there are strong arguments for the opposite view; see, e.g., McGlynn (2014, Ch. 8).
13 See Williamson (2000, Ch. 9).
14 The argument is really an objection to the internalist’s conception of evidence, although it can be 
formulated without omitting any of his central points, as I do here, as an argument for the E = K thesis. 
Indeed, since the passage quoted from Williamson (2000) occurs in the middle of his chapter on evi-
dence, where he argues that the E = K thesis is superior to more traditional internalist conceptions of 
evidence, I think an argument along the lines I present is hinted at in that chapter.
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If one’s evidence were restricted to the contents of one’s own mind, it could not 
play the role it actually does in science. The evidence for the proposition that 
the sun is larger than the earth is not just my present experiences or degrees 
of belief. If the evidence is widened to include other people’s experiences or 
degrees of belief, or my past ones, then my identification of it becomes even 
more fallible. In any case, that does not seem to be the right widening; it is 
more plausible that the evidence for a scientific theory is the sort of thing 
which is made public in scientific journals. (Williamson, 2000, 193.)
And later in The Philosophy of Philosophy, he writes:
It is fanciful to regard evidence in the natural sciences as consisting of psycho-
logical facts rather than, for example, facts about the results of experiments 
and measurements. When scientists state their evidence in their publications, 
they state mainly non-psychological facts (unless they are psychologists); are 
they not best placed to know what their evidence is? (Williamson, 2007b, 212.)
In these passages, Williamson claims that when scientists argue for theories or 
hypotheses—like that the sun is larger than the earth—they don’t rely on premises 
about their internal states as evidence for them. Rather, they argue from premises 
about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the members 
of the scientific community,15 which is easily explained by his E = K thesis. Indeed, 
according to the E = K thesis, the reason we find it so natural to treat our knowledge 
as evidence in the scientific discourse (and other kinds discourse as well) is because 
it is our evidence.
Moreover, this is also thought to pose a big problem for the internalist. Indeed, 
Williamson’s point can be presented as a modus tollens against internalism. To see 
why that is so, recall that internalism holds that facts about which doxastic attitudes 
one now has justification (to a certain degree) to hold supervene upon one’s non-fac-
tive mental states. Thus defined, it follows from internalism that a pair of epistemic 
agents, one of whom is in a normal scenario where everything is as it seems and the 
other of whom is in a subjectively indistinguishable deceptive scenario (like those 
that typically involve envatment or Cartesian demons), have the same evidence and 
are equally justified in holding the same beliefs. However, if Williamson’s point is 
correct, then agents in subjectively indistinguishable normal and deceptive scenarios 
need not have the same (scientific) evidence (since one of them can have knowledge 
that the other lacks) and can therefore fail to be equally justified in holding the same 
beliefs—in which case internalism must be false.16
15 The notion of common knowledge that I believe Williamson here (implicitly) is operating with is an 
intuitive notion; it is not the notion that we find in epistemic logics. According to the latter notion, Φ 
is common knowledge among the agents in A if and only if (i) Φ is true, (ii) everybody in A knows 
that Φ is true, (iii) everybody in A knows that everybody in A knows that Φ is true, and (iv) everybody 
in A knows that,..., everybody in A knows that Φ is true, ad infinitum:  CAΦ = Φ ∧  KAΦ ∧  KAKAΦ ∧ 
 KAKAKAΦ...
16 “That one has the same evidence in the good and bad cases is a severe constraint on the nature of 
evidence. It is inconsistent with the view that evidence consist of true propositions like those standardly 
offered as evidence for scientific theories.” (Williamson, 2000, 173.).
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4  Response to Williamson on Scientific Evidence
In response to the argument that our conception of scientific evidence strongly sup-
ports the E = K thesis, and hence externalism in general, I will make three points as 
to why that isn’t the case.
First, talk about evidence, both in scientific and everyday contexts, doesn’t sup-
port the E = K thesis. Instead, it supports only a more moderate version of external-
ism according to which both internal states and external factors count as evidence.17 
To see why that is so, notice that we often talk about evidence without referring to 
our knowledge. For example, if someone asks you what your evidence for believing 
that the Berlin wall fell on June 13th, 1990, is, it is completely natural to answer by 
pointing to an encyclopedia article in front of you, saying that “my evidence is right 
there, just take look yourself”—which refers to a physical object (i.e., the encyclo-
pedia article), rather than a proposition you know, as your evidence. Or you can 
answer simply by saying that “I experienced the event myself”—which refers to an 
internal state as evidence.18 Either way, our ordinary and everyday talk about evi-
dence doesn’t support the E = K thesis.
Similarly, when we talk about scientific evidence, we also often talk as if internal 
states and external factors besides propositions we know are evidence. For example, 
if someone asks you what your evidence for a certain hypothesis h is, a natural reply 
is that “my evidence for h was gathered during last year’s excavation”—which again 
refers to physical objects (i.e., those that were gathered at the excavation), rather 
than known propositions, as scientific evidence. Or, another natural way of answer-
ing the question is to say that “the evidence for the hypothesis h is observations 
o1,..., on”—which refers to internal states as scientific evidence. So even though we 
sometimes do refer to our knowledge as (scientific) evidence (either explicitly or 
implicitly), talk about evidence, both in scientific and everyday contexts, only seems 
to support a somewhat moderate externalism, according to which both internal states 
and external factors can provide (scientific) evidence.19
Second, the E = K thesis isn’t supported by our intuitive conception of scien-
tific evidence since it is possible that there are false propositions included in our 
17 A similar point is also made by Turri (2009) and Kelly (2008).
18 An anonymous reviewer helpfully suggested that this need not count against E = K, since you know 
that you had the relevant experience. However, in response, I claim that it is possible that you (in the 
hypothetical) only think that you had the experience, but without actually knowing that to be the case. 
Indeed, you may have a justified true belief that you had the experience, but without knowing so, since 
you don’t satisfy whatever “no-Gettier” condition is required to turn a justified true belief into knowl-
edge. Moreover, even though the experience is not included in the content of some relevant higher-order 
knowledge, it still functions as evidence—in which case it does count against the E = K thesis. I want to 
thank the reviewer for pressing me on this point.
19 In fact, to the extent that the notion of “public evidence” can be analyzed in internalist terms (which 
I argue that it can in Sect. 6), it doesn’t even support that much. If there indeed is such an analysis avail-
able, then this fact about language use supports internalism.
 Moreover, it should also be noted that this “moderate externalism” actually is compatible with internal-
ism insofar its proponents can argue that although both internal and external factors can count as (scien-
tific) evidence, only internal factors can count as justifying evidence.
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scientific evidence. For example, we can imagine scientific propositions that are 
false but rightly treated as evidence since they enjoy great predictive success and 
are strongly corroborated by other things we know. Indeed, not only can we imagine 
such scenarios, but we also seem to find them in the actual history of science.20
Consider the curious case of Bohr and Sommerfield who, by relying on a flawed 
model of the atom in which electrons literally orbit the nucleus in a circular or ellip-
tical fashion, successfully predicted the spectral lines of various elements.21 At the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, a problem-
atic and up to that point unexplained phenomenon was the characteristic spectra of 
different elements; every element emits and absorbs light only at certain specific fre-
quencies. Before Bohr, most explanations of the phenomenon were no more than far-
fetched speculations.22 However, in 1913, Bohr explained the spectral lines of any 
element in terms of the possible orbits of the electrons in the element’s atoms. His 
theory had tremendous success in explaining the spectral lines of ionized helium. 
The physicist and science historian Abraham Pais writes as follows about the event:
Up to that time no one had ever produced anything like it in the realm of spec-
troscopy, agreement between theory and experiment up to five significant fig-
ures. (Pais, 1991, 149.)
Indeed, his theory was so successful that many of his contemporaries were abso-
lutely convinced that it had to be correct. Einstein, for example, said that “this is a 
tremendous result. The theory of Bohr must then be right.”23
Nevertheless, as it turns out, Bohr’s theory wasn’t able to explain the spectral 
lines of hydrogen. So in 1916 Sommerfield further developed Bohr’s initial theory 
and was able to offer accurate predictions. The expanded theory of Sommerfield was 
indeed so successful that by 1920 there was almost universal agreement among the 
physicists of the time that the theory not only had to be correct, but that it was the 
only viable model for atomic and quantum research.24 In fact, the formula Sommer-
field derived from his theory in order to explain the frequency at which hydrogen 
emits and absorbs light is the exact same as the one that we nowadays use for the 
same purpose. However, as it turns out, we now know that the Bohr-Sommerfield 
theory is wrong, and it has been replaced with a new theoretical model (which 
includes the Schrödinger equation). Yet, it remains a fantastic coincidence that Som-
merfield was able to derive the correct formula from a wholly inadequate theory.25 
20 There are also many counterexamples to the claim that false propositions cannot be included in one’s 
evidence in everyday situations. See, e.g., Warfield (2005); Klein (2008); Fitelson (2010); Arnold (2011); 
Rizzeri (2011); and Egeland (forthcoming). Littlejohn (2012, 106–109), however, critically argues 
against some these examples, and McCain (2016, 25–27) responds to his argument.
21 For an interesting discussion of the case, which relates it to the realism/anti-realism debate, see Vick-
ers (2012).
22 According to Pais (1986, 197): “So it was when Bohr came along. In his words, in those early days 
spectra were as interesting and incomprehensible as the colors of a butterfly’s wing.”.
23 Cited in Pais (1991, 154).
24 See Kragh (2012, Ch. 4).
25 Kronig (cited in Kragh, 1985, 84), for example, says that it is “perhaps the most remarkable numerical 
coincidence in the history of physics.”.
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In his discussion of the development, acceptance, and eventual rejection of the Bohr-
Sommerfield theory, Helge Kragh offers the following remark:
By some sort of historical magic, Sommerfield managed in 1916 to get the 
correct formula from what turned out to be an utterly inadequate model. . . 
[This] illustrates the well-known fact that incorrect physical theories may well 
lead to correct formulae and predictions. (Kragh, 1985, 84.)
Now, for the present purposes, the question we need to ask is whether the false 
Bohr-Sommerfield theory (or the false propositions comprising it) did, or at least 
could, count as evidence for other scientific hypotheses once it became clear that it 
was able to successfully explain the observational data about spectral lines? I think 
we should answer in the affirmative. The false Bohr-Sommerfield theory clearly 
played an important theoretical role in the epistemologico-scientific project at the 
time; indeed, so much so that when Sommerfield derived the true formula that suc-
cessfully explained the relevant data from his theory, the theory itself became justi-
fied to such a degree that it could be used as scientific evidence for other hypoth-
eses or derivations.,2627 If, for example, the theory could be shown to support a 
certain interesting and not yet empirically tested hypothesis, then it does seem that 
we would have good reason to believe in that hypothesis. More specifically, Som-
merfield’s theory, which itself was justified by its explanatory power and predictive 
success, would provide evidence in favor of said hypothesis by conferring (some of) 
its justification upon it. Moreover, not only does this seem intuitive, it appears to be 
more or less what actually happened. Before its eventual downfall, when the Bohr-
Sommerfield theory enjoyed almost universal support among contemporary physi-
cists, the theory, with all its success, was, as noted above, thought to provide the 
only viable model for further research in the field. Indeed, not only does the theory 
appear to have been accorded evidential significance, it also appears to have created 
something like a scientific paradigm,28 the basis of which could be used in order to 
epistemically evaluate and justify further research—at least for a time.
A possible—perhaps even obvious—objection to my argument is that the Bohr-
Sommerfield theory eventually was overturned and recognized as false, and that it 
therefore didn’t really provide bona fide scientific evidence to begin with. Although 
it is completely understandable why physicists in the early twentieth century might 
have believed that the theory was true and should be included in their evidence set, 
28 Although not necessarily in the sense that Kuhn (1996) uses the term.
26 If someone were to object that we shouldn’t think of scientific theories or propositions as scientific 
evidence, which is more akin to observational data, then I would be happy to concede that such theories/
propositions are evidentially significant, but aren’t scientific evidence. And that, moreover, is sufficient to 
counter the E = K thesis. All that is required is that false theories/propositions can function as evidence, 
scientific or other.
27 Indeed, this is precisely why the Bohr-Sommerfield case is an example of “historical magic”—to use 
a term from Kragh. It is not because the derivation in question was made on the basis of something non-
evidential, but because it was made on the basis of something non-true.
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the fact that it is false shows their belief to have been mistaken. In response, I want 
to point out the extreme skeptical consequences that seem to follow from this line 
of thought. For if one bites the bullet and says, contrary to intuition, that false (but 
strongly corroborated) scientific propositions cannot function as evidence, then 
beliefs based on those propositions cannot be justified (at least not by the proposi-
tions themselves). And if this truly is the case, then the history of science doesn’t 
only appear to be filled with scientifically informed and ever more sophisticated 
false beliefs that (hopefully at least) gradually approximate the truth, but it is also 
filled with scientifically informed ever more sophisticated unjustified beliefs. But I 
don’t think that this is the sort of skepticism we want to live with. If it were true, 
then the history of science would present us with a wonderful and gradually chang-
ing picture of the universe, albeit one that for the most part is unjustified. Moreover, 
by pessimistic meta-induction, we might not only be compelled to conclude that our 
present picture of the universe most likely is false (for the most part), but also that it 
isn’t even justified. However, since we clearly do seem to be justified in holding our 
scientific world-view and our scientifically informed beliefs (at least most of them), 
I therefore think that the objection ultimately fails.
Another problem with the objection is that something similar to the Bohr-Som-
merfield case appears to be going on today, especially when it comes to our reliance 
on scientific theories or models that strictly speaking are false or inaccurate, and 
which we may know to be false/inaccurate, but which nevertheless are accorded evi-
dential significance. Good examples are provided by models involving idealizations, 
smoothing of data sets,29 or ceteris paribus clauses. Although such models often 
will be false or inaccurate,30 they can be very useful in calculating or predicting the 
outcome of experiments or real world events. They are, as Catherine Elgin (2017) 
recently put it, “felicitous falsehoods”—i.e., falsehoods which are “true enough” 
insofar as they are essential to our scientific practice, justify our acceptance of vari-
ous theories and hypotheses, and contribute to our understanding of certain scien-
tific topics and domains.31 Elgin provides an illuminating study of many such mod-
els. For example, astronomers often rely on models which don’t take into account 
29 To smooth a data set is to create an approximating function that captures the most important patterns 
in the data, while leaving out noise or statistically unlikely occurrences.
30 One might think that this is an odd statement to make, and that scientific models don’t have truth-
values since they aren’t propositional. However, my view is that scientific models—not unlike normal 
sentences—can express propositions that of course can be true of false.
31 Following a recent trend in epistemology and philosophy of science (see, e.g., Grimm, Baumberger, & 
Ammon (2017)), Elgin claims that the purpose of science (or at least one of its purposes) is to facilitate 
understanding rather than (propositional) knowledge. Understanding, moreover, involves competent use 
of the information one has in the furthering of one’s epistemic goals: “To understand a topic involves 
knowing how to wield one’s commitments to further one’s epistemic ends. It involves being able to draw 
inferences, raise questions, frame potentially fruitful inquiries, and so forth. Since some of the commit-
ments are likely to be felicitous falsehoods and others to be methodological or normative commitments 
that are not truth apt, understanding is not factive. It is not a type of knowledge; it does not consist exclu-
sively or primarily in believing or accepting truths.” (Elgin, 2017, 3.).
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important features of planets, or which simply treat them as point masses without 
spatial extension when they want to calculate their motion (see Elgin, 2017, 27). 
Yet, despite systematically misrepresenting their objects of study in important ways, 
such models are evidentially significant insofar they contribute (epistemically) to the 
justification of various theories, hypotheses, or beliefs—or so I suggest. Although 
she is less appreciative of traditional epistemological notions—such as “belief, 
assertion, and knowledge”32—Elgin similarly stresses the epistemic importance that 
felicitously false models have, claiming that their falsity or inaccuracy “does not 
undermine [their] epistemic function[s]” (Elgin, 2017, 3).
The third problem with Williamson’s view on scientific evidence is that 
there are many deception scenarios that seem to provide strong support for 
internalism, and hence against the E = K thesis. The kind of argument that I have 
in mind has played an important role in the epistemological literature on the 
internalism–externalism debate, but has had much less influence on discussions 
about scientific evidence in particular.33 Consider, for example, your favorite 
deception scenario. In it, everything seems to be just as if it isn’t a deception 
scenario, even though it is. Indeed, it is subjectively indistinguishable from the 
corresponding good or normal scenario. As a result, despite their falsity and 
unreliability, our scientific theories and beliefs seem to be just as justified as they 
would have been in the corresponding good scenario. And this strongly supports 
the claim that our scientific evidence doesn’t depend on typical external factors 
like knowledge, truth, or reliability. Instead, it only depends on factors that the 
normal and deceptive scenarios have in common—the best candidate of which 
is our internal states. So reflection on deception scenarios and the epistemic 
status of our scientific theories and beliefs in those scenarios provides 
strong intuitive support for internalism. And, moreover, since internalism 
is incompatible with the E = K thesis, it also counts against Williamson’s 
position.34
Taken together, these three points show that, on balance, we have a conception 
of scientific evidence that Williamson’s E = K thesis cannot account for. Philo-
sophical reflection on scientific evidence shouldn’t be seen as providing an argu-
ment for epistemic externalism via the E = K thesis. However, whether it sup-
ports internalism or a more moderate version of externalism remains to be seen. 
Much of the disagreement between the positions appears to depend on different 
intuitions (or different beliefs about their epistemic significance) about how we 
32 Elgin (2017, 9).
33 The locus classicus of the argument is provided by Lehrer and Cohen (1983).
34 Williamson (2007a) has responded to this kind of argument by drawing a distinction between justifi-
cation and blamelessness, while claiming that victims of deceptions scenarios are blamelessly unjusti-
fied in holding their beliefs. However, a problem with Williamson’s response, first pointed out by Pryor 
(2001), is that it commits him to having to give highly counterintuitive verdicts about other scenarios. 
Other, more recent worries are raised by Greco (forthcoming).
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should evaluate epistemic agents (and theories/beliefs) in deception scenarios.35 
Recently, I have defended the view that our philosophical intuitions about such 
cases provide strong support for internalism against various counterarguments.36 
However, I will not revisit this issue here. Instead, in the next section, I will dis-
cuss a feature of scientific evidence that often is thought to provide a very strong 
argument—indeed, perhaps even a knockdown argument—against internalism, 
namely, its public character.
5  The Public Character of Scientific Evidence
Scientific evidence is often believed to have a public character insofar as it can be 
appreciated and shared by different people. For example, according to Carl Hempel:
[A]ll statements of empirical science are capable of test by reference to evi-
dence which is public, i.e., evidence which can be secured by different observ-
ers and does not depend essentially on the observer. (Hempel, 1952, 22.)
Similarly, Karl Popper writes:
The objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-
subjectively tested. (Popper, 1959, 44.)
The publicity of scientific evidence has for several decades been thought to cre-
ate problems for internalism, since the internalist conception of evidence seems to 
require that it have a much more private character (cf. Kelly, 2016). Peter Railton 
remarks:
36 See Egeland (2019).
35 Another source of disagreement concerns the relevance of the internalism–externalism debate in phi-
losophy of mind for the internalism–externalism debate in epistemology. Whether or not externalism in 
the philosophy of mind supports externalism in epistemology by (i) entailing epistemic externalism and 
(ii) receiving intuitive support from reflection on various scenarios is a contested issue. To evaluate this 
kind of argument, it is important to note that externalism in the philosophy of mind can mean either 
content externalism, which says that some mental states have contents that are individuated in virtue 
of relations to the external environment, or vehicle externalism, which says that some mental states (as 
vehicles of content) are individuated in virtue of relations to the external environment. In the literature, 
three arguments have been offered for the view that content externalism entails epistemic externalism: 
BonJour’s (1992) Accessibility Argument, Boghossian’s (1989) Self-Knowledge Argument, and Chase’s 
(2001) Process Argument. However, all of the arguments rely on contentious premises and therefore 
remain unconvincing. When it comes to the view that vehicle externalism entails epistemic externalism, 
fewer arguments have been offered in the literature. However, a couple of recent arguments by Carter 
et  al. (2014) and Smithies (2018) plausibly suggest that accessibilism, together with certain plausible 
background assumptions, is incompatible with vehicle externalism. A reasonable, albeit somewhat tenta-
tive conclusion to draw from these discussions is that although epistemic internalists will have a hard 
time squaring their position with vehicle externalism, they should be able to endorse externalism about 
content without inconsistency—at the very least, doing so seems to be “a live option,” as Carter et al. 
(2014) put it in their review of the current literature about these issues.
 That being said, it would be somewhat odd to characterize a mentalist who thinks that non-factive men-
tal states with externally individuated content can play a role in conferring justification upon one’s dox-
astic attitudes as an internalist, since this in effect would mean that the one’s evidence in some sense 
includes things that are external to the subject’s mind.
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[O]bjective inquiry uses procedures that are intersubjective and independ-
ent of particular individuals and circumstances—e.g., its experiments are 
reproducible, its methods are determinate, its criteria are effective, and it 
makes no essential use of introspective or subjectively privileged evidence 
in theory assessment.,3738 (Railton, 1984, 815.)
As recently has been made much more clear by Kelly, the problem for the inter-
nalist is that they cannot easily explain how scientific evidence comes to be shared 
by multiple individuals in the objective pursuit of scientific knowledge. As Kelly 
sees it, the internalist conception of evidence—which he occasionally, following 
Williamson (2000, 173), calls the phenomenal conception of evidence39—cannot 
account for the actual scientific practice wherein evidence is shared among different 
individuals in order to further the scientific project. This is how he puts it:
[T]he phenomenal conception of evidence would seem to fit poorly with the 
way in which the concept is employed in scientific and legal contexts. Notably, 
in such contexts, a large value is placed on the publicity of evidence, i.e., on 
the fact that paradigmatic evidence is something that can be shared by multi-
ple individuals. Indeed, it is this public character of evidence which is often 
taken to underwrite the possibility of an inquiry that is genuinely objective. If 
evidence is taken to include (e.g.) facts about the external world, then, inas-
much as multiple individuals can be aware of the same facts, one and the same 
piece of evidence can literally be shared by those individuals. In contrast, a 
view according to which my evidence is limited to my own non-factive mental 
states does not seem to allow for this, inasmuch as I do not literally share my 
own token mental states with anyone else. At best, the sense in which evidence 
can be shared by multiple individuals on such a picture is a matter of their 
being in distinct but similar mental states (perhaps: token experiential states 
of the same type). It is far from obvious that such a surrogate would provide 
the kind of objectivity which literally shared public evidence is often taken to 
afford. (Kelly, 2008, 949–950.)
37 Cf. Hempel (1952) and Feigl (1953), the latter of whom says: “The quest for scientific knowledge is... 
regulated by certain standards of criteria... The most important of these regulative ideas are:
1. Intersubjective Testability. This is only a more adequate formulation of what is generally meant by 
the ‘objectivity’ of science. What is here involved is... the requirement that the knowledge claims 
of science be in principle capable of test... on the part of any person properly equipped with intel-
ligence and the technical devices of observation or experimentation. The term intersubjective 
stresses the social nature of the scientific enterprise. If there be any ‘truths’ that are accessible 
only to privileged individuals, such as mystics or visionaries—that is, knowledge-claims which by 
their very nature cannot independently be checked by anyone else—then such ‘truths’ are not of 
the kind that we seek in the sciences. The criterion of intersubjective testability thus delimits the 
scientific from the nonscientific activities of man.” (Feigl, 1953, 11.).
38 Railton’s statement is very strong. As a result, it fails to account for the fact that introspective reports 
by subjects provide key data in contemporary cognitive science and psychophysics—especially in the 
study of consciousness. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Goldman (1997).
39 This is actually a misnomer since even though some internalists do have a phenomenal conception of 
evidence, not all do.
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Here, Kelly not only tells us that internalism will have a difficult time account-
ing for the public character of scientific evidence, he also provides an (externalist) 
example of what such evidence may consist of that does account for its publicity. 
He says that our scientific evidence may (at least for the most part) be comprised of 
facts about the external world. Moreover, as will become clear (in the quoted para-
graphs below), facts about the external world should most naturally be understood 
as physical objects or states of affairs in which such objects figure, rather than true 
propositions. On this picture, it is mind-independent objects and the relations among 
them—like, for example, rock formations, cells in a petri dish, or bone fragments 
found at burial sites—that constitute the evidence for our scientific theories and 
hypotheses, and which make relevant propositions about those objects and states of 
affairs true.40
This kind of evidence has aptly been called “scientific evidence” (Conee & Feld-
man, 2008) and “factual evidence” (Lyons, 2016) in the literature, and Kelly’s view 
appears to receive support from the way in which we often find ourselves talking 
about scientific evidence. For example, we often talk about gathering evidence—
whether it be fingerprints, rocks, or any other such object—which seems to assume 
that physical objects can function as evidence. Moreover, it isn’t hard to see why 
Kelly, with his claim that scientific evidence is comprised of facts (understood in 
the manner above), easily will be able to explain the public character of scientific 
evidence. Since such facts typically are accessible to different observers or experi-
menters—the bone fragments found at ancient burial sites are in principle available 
for study by different scientists—the evidence they provide can literally be shared 
by different people. These are exactly the points Kelly (2016) makes in his Stanford 
Encyclopedia article on evidence:
This [internalist] picture of evidence stands in no small measure of tension 
with the idea that a central function of evidence is to serve as a neutral arbiter 
among competing views. For it is natural to think that the ability of evidence 
to play this latter role depends crucially on its having an essentially public 
character, i.e., that it is the sort of thing which can be grasped and appreci-
ated by multiple individuals. Here, the most natural contenders would seem to 
be physical objects and the states of affairs and events in which they partici-
pate, since it is such entities that are characteristically accessible to multiple 
observers. (I ask what evidence there is for your diagnosis that the patient suf-
fers from measles; in response, you might simply point to or demonstrate the 
lesions on her skin.)
Here, Kelly points out that the internalist will have a hard time accounting for 
the public character of scientific evidence, before arguing that the view which most 
naturally explains the publicity of evidence is one according to which one’s evi-
dence consists of physical objects and the states of affairs and events in which they 
figure. Moreover, he continues to press the point that internalism, in contrast to his 
40 Thus, the view clearly differs from that of Williamson, who thinks that it is the propositions we know 
that constitute our evidence.
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own view, is incompatible with the public character of scientific evidence and that it 
therefore cannot account for scientific objectivity:
On the other hand, to the extent that one’s evidence consists of essentially pri-
vate states there would seem to be no possibility of sharing one’s evidence 
with others. But it is precisely the possibility of sharing relevant evidence 
which is naturally thought to secure the objectivity of science. Indeed, it has 
often been held that inasmuch as the objectivity of science is underwritten by 
the fact that science is evidence driven, it is the public character of scientific 
evidence which is crucial. On this view, it is a central methodological norm of 
science to eschew as inadmissible (e.g.) any alleged episodes of incommunica-
ble insight in considering whether to accept or reject a claim.
According to Kelly, internalism is therefore unable, or at the very least hard 
pressed, to account for the public character of scientific evidence. As he sees it, a 
much more plausible (externalist) view holds that our scientific evidence consists 
of facts about the external world, understood in terms of mind-independent physical 
objects and the states of affairs in which they figure. Contrary to internalism, such a 
view is clearly able to account for the publicity of scientific evidence insofar as facts 
(in principle) can be gathered, observed, shared, and studied by multiple individuals.
6  Response to Kelly on the Publicity of Scientific Evidence
Before I explain why I think that the internalist can account for the publicity of 
scientific evidence, I’m going argue that Kelly’s view on the matter is problematic 
insofar as the picture of scientific evidence that it presents isn’t epistemologically 
interesting. I take it that any epistemologically interesting theory of evidence must 
present it as something that makes an epistemic difference by rationalizing or jus-
tifying belief in certain inferentially supported propositions. However, this is pre-
cisely what Kelly’s view fails to do. The problem, more specifically, is that if facts, 
understood as physical objects and the relations between them, are scientific evi-
dence, then it is possible to have scientific evidence that doesn’t make an epistemic 
difference since the evidence (contrary to what was established in Sect. 2) needn’t 
be in our cognitive possession. For example, there may some object—e.g., cells in a 
petri dish, bone fragments, and pieces of old parchment—on a table next to me, but 
that is not in itself sufficient to justify me (or anyone else) in believing any proposi-
tion. There may thus be a sense in which the object counts as “evidence” (or some-
thing approximating evidence)—after all, a colleague may tell you to “look at the 
evidence gathered on the table next to you”—but it isn’t evidence in any epistemo-
logically interesting sense. A similar point is also made by Earl Conee and Richard 
Feldman, who write as follows about the view that facts are evidence:
Suppose that some factor, S, is scientific evidence, for some condition, C. . . [O]
ne can [then] have scientific evidence without having any reason at all to believe 
what that scientific evidence supports. . . More generally, something can be 
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scientific evidence for a proposition without being justifying evidence for that 
proposition. Justifying evidence is by itself a reason for belief, something one 
could in principle cite as a justifying basis for belief. (Conee & Feldman, 2008, 
84–85.)41
So if we allow facts (in Kelly’s sense) to function as scientific evidence, then 
it becomes possible to have evidence that doesn’t have any rational or justificatory 
force.42
This, however, is a problem that neither the internalist nor the externalist need be 
burdened with. Both kinds of view can account for the fact that we somehow need 
to be in cognitive possession of our evidence. Consider, for example, Williamson’s 
E = K thesis again. According to it, only a proper subset of the true propositions is 
evidence. What is required in order for a true proposition to function as evidence is 
that it is grasped in the right sort of way, or, in other words, that it is known. And 
knowing a proposition to be true is clearly sufficient in order to possess that proposi-
tion as justifying evidence. Similarly, the internalist can also satisfy the possession 
requirement by, for example, claiming that only propositions that are the contents of 
some of our attitudes (e.g., our beliefs or experiences) can function as justifying evi-
dence. The propositions, according to the internalist, will not necessarily all be true, 
but, as we saw above, this shouldn’t stop them from having justificatory force. Our 
evidence, scientific and other, can include false propositions.
Now having argued that Kelly’s view fails to be epistemologically interesting 
insofar as it counts as scientific evidence factors that need not make an epistemic 
difference when it comes to which propositions we have justification to believe,43 
and that this is a problem which neither internalists nor externalists must face, I will 
now explain why standard internalist and externalist views can account for the pub-
lic character of scientific evidence. If it thus turns out that Kelly’s view faces prob-
lems that other internalist and externalist views don’t face, while the latter views also 
can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, then we will have good reason to 
reject Kelly’s view in favor of the less problematic internalist/externalist views. Let 
me begin by pointing out two different ways in which scientific evidence appears to 
be public. On the one hand, scientific evidence appears to be the kind of thing that 
typically is shared between multiple individuals in scientific books and journals, and 
at conferences and symposia. On the other hand, scientific evidence also appears 
to be sharable, perhaps in a more direct sense, by multiple individuals making the 
same observations or that are involved in the same experiments. It seems to me that 
Kelly’s view is able to account for the latter kind of publicity, but not the former, 
whereas there are internalist and externalist alternatives that are able to account for 
both kinds. Let me explain more precisely why I think that is so.
41 Cf. Lyons (2016, 1058): “In order for e to serve as evidence for S that p, the evidence must be taken in 
by S, and done so in a way that allows S to in some sense appreciate its evidential significance vis-à-vis 
p... Even if there is some sense in which beliefs are indirectly based on—and justified in virtue of being 
based on—extramental facts, this is only ever true in virtue of their being more proximately based on 
some mental state.”.
42 A similar counterargument against the view that one’s evidence is comprised of objects or states of 
affairs is offered by Neta (2008, 98–99).
43 Or the degree to which we have justification to believe them.
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If scientific evidence consists of physical objects and the states of affairs in which 
they figure, as Kelly would have it, then there is a straightforward sense in which 
scientists and researchers making observations (or that are involved in experiments) 
share the same evidence. It is after all the same objects or states of affairs that are 
responsible for their observations and experimental results. The scientists literally 
share the same scientific evidence since they make observations on the basis of the 
same facts (as Kelly understands the term). However, when we consider the way in 
which scientific evidence typically is shared in scientific books and journals, or at 
conferences and symposia, Kelly’s view appears to be in trouble. For how can it be 
that physical objects or states of affairs literally are shared in journals or at confer-
ences? There doesn’t appear to be any straightforward sense in which this is possi-
ble. Indeed, it seems that the evidence that is provided in such fora is characteristi-
cally unlike the physical objects and states of affairs that are being researched.
In contrast to Kelly’s position, however, internalist and externalist views accord-
ing to which our evidence consists of propositions that are the contents of (some of) 
our attitudes can easily account for the way in which scientific evidence typically 
is shared in journals and at conferences.44 Such fora allow for intersubjective dis-
semination and appreciation of scientific evidence through testimony that usually 
is offered in the form of written or spoken words, or figures, graphs, models, or 
illustrations. Thus, testimonially transferred propositions become a source of scien-
tific justification and knowledge of (other) inferentially supported propositions by 
functioning as evidence for them.45 But what about the other way in which scien-
tific evidence typically is shared—by different individuals making the same obser-
vations? According to the internalist and externalist views under consideration, the 
observations in question will have propositional content that can be shared by differ-
ent scientists and researchers making the (qualitatively) same (but numerically dif-
ferent) observations. On these views, it is such evidentially significant propositions 
that naturally are shared and which eventually, if all goes well, make their way into 
journals or books, and that are presented at conferences or symposia.
It thus seems that there are internalist and externalist alternatives that fare better 
than Kelly’s view, both when it comes to accounting for the publicity of scientific 
evidence and the justifying role it plays. But what about the internalism–external-
ism distinction itself? Does, for example, Williamson’s E = K thesis provide a bet-
ter explanation of our conception of scientific evidence than internalism? I think 
not.46 The reason: not only do we refer to internal states (or their propositional con-
tent) as scientific evidence, but (at times) we also rely on theories and models that, 
strictly speaking, are false, but which nevertheless function as evidence for various 
44 Cf. the quoted passage by Williamson (2000, 193) above.
45 Strictly speaking, figures, graphs, models, and illustrations are not necessarily propositional. But nei-
ther are strings of words. Moreover, just as strings of words often do facilitate transmission of (eviden-
tially significant) propositions, so do figures, graphs, models, and illustrations.
46 Recall from the introduction that the purpose of the paper is to evaluate whether our conception of 
scientific evidence fits better with externalism than internalism, and to demonstrate that the arguments 
purporting to show that that indeed is the case ultimately fail.
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hypotheses and scientifically informed beliefs.47 I therefore think that a more plau-
sible (and moderate) externalist view says that some, but not all, scientific evidence 
is provided by our knowledge. This kind of externalist view will not only be able to 
account for our use of false models and the way in which we talk about scientific 
evidence, but to account for its publicity and justifying role as well.
But this, however, still doesn’t help us much when it comes to the internal-
ism–externalism distinction itself. Isn’t it still the case that our conception of sci-
entific evidence supports externalism rather than internalism, you may ask. If the 
arguments above are sound, then that would be a premature conclusion. Indeed, the 
goal of this article has been to show that, contrary to what many epistemologists and 
philosophers of science assume, considerations of scientific evidence do not clearly 
support either position. More specifically, the way in which we talk about scientific 
evidence seems to support a moderate version of externalism, according to which 
both internal states and external factors (like known propositions) can provide scien-
tific evidence. However, by reflecting on deception scenarios, it seems intuitive that 
only internal states can provide such evidence. I therefore suspect that the internal-
ism–externalism debate won’t be resolved until the parties agree (at least to a larger 
extent than what currently is the case) on more fundamental methodological issues 
about the epistemic significance of our philosophical intuitions and of our talk about 
epistemic concepts, like evidence and reason.
7  Conclusion
In this article, I have presented and responded to two arguments from the litera-
ture to the effect that internalism cannot account for our conception of scientific evi-
dence. The first argument is offered (or hinted at) by Williamson, and it claims that 
the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the 
fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) 
that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. In 
response, I showed that the E = K thesis isn’t supported by the way in which we talk 
about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account for facts about what has 
been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief in the history of 
science. The second argument is offered by Kelly (for example), and it claims that 
only externalism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. 
In response, I argued that there are internalist views that can account for the public-
ity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than 
the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly.
The internalism–externalism debate has been raging for almost half a century, 
and there have been many arguments hoping to sway the opposing party to their own 
side. Some of the arguments that often are thought to provide a very strong case for 
externalism focus on our conception of scientific evidence. In this article, I have 




Instead, it appears that the dialectical force which the various arguments in debate 
have—including those that focus on scientific evidence—is hostage to disagreement 
about deeper methodological issues. Arguably, the most important lesson we can 
learn from the decades of debate is that fundamental philosophical disputes—like 
the internalism–externalism dispute—will not be resolved until (a larger amount of) 
agreement is reached between the parties about the epistemic significance of intui-
tion, the way in which we usually talk about various concepts, and our common 
sense conceptions themselves. Although considerations of scientific evidence are 
unlikely to settle the internalism–externalism debate in the near future, it may do so 
given that the proper amount of attention and study is devoted to the deeper meth-
odological issues that separate its disputants.
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